AUKUS ការរុះរើដើម្បីសន្តិសុខអន្តរជាតិនិងការបញ្ចប់ណាតូ?
While it is true that the security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the Unites States (AUKUS) does not directly interfere with the purpose and the geographical sphere of influence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); now has it caused major disagreements among European NATO members, it does have the potential to push unwanted changes at European and global level in terms of issues of security and potential alliances.
For Europe the consequences may not be immediate. However, it cannot be ignored that 2 of the most militarily important NATO members, the US, and the UK, have decided to join this pact. France is, so far, the country that has been affected the most when Australia ditched the 38.6-billion-euro agreement to build 12 diesel-fuelled submarines to procure American-built nuclear propelled ones instead. The US is alienating France, forgetting that it is one of the US oldest allies, and one of the most militarily capable NATO members in the European continent. France is also an important actor in the Indo-Pacific region, the area of influence of AUKUS, as there are approximately 1.6 million French citizens living in that region.
AUKUS starts with a serious diplomatic failure: not including France in the deal. Although it is not too late to rectify, as the promised equipment to the Australians will take almost a decade or more to build, there are little prospects the US would consider adding France, and there are also little incentives for the French to join 3 countries that have stabbed it on its back.
This pact could also worsen the already fractured relationship between the US and Europe, the UK and Europe. Prospects for cooperation now seem dim after this agreement. This is a double-edged sword. It benefits China as it is sowing discord among powers; and it is also an incentive for France, and possibly the European Union (EU) as a whole. Although there are robust agreements in place between the UK and France, such as the Lancaster House Treaties, the way both countries proceed in the pursue of their foreign policy individually and at continental level, will determine how hard or soft the blow is for both the EU and NATO. The fracture can open the door for the idea for greater European autonomy. Germany is preoccupied with its general election, allowing France to make use of this to take a more protagonistic role to advance further EU independence.
AUKUS militarily speaking does not pose any real threat to China or the region. It does, however, signals a very strategic game among all actors involved. The pact has positively impacted the UK, who after Brexit, has seen this agreement as a small victory over Europe. The United Kingdom has finally set itself free from the subjugating practiced of the EU. AUKUS has also come to strengthen the Global Britain policy it pursued since its exit from the EU and its reclaiming its place in international affairs. Secondly, for the UK, the support given by the Biden administration also means the US has decided to side with the UK and not with Europe when it comes to China’s rise.
A more overlooked downsize of this pact is the danger of nuclear proliferation. Although it is unlikely that Australia will start developing the idea of nuclear weapons any time soon. So far, the rule is that any country with nuclear powered submarines are also holders of nuclear weapons. Allowing Australia, a non-nuclear state, to own such submarines is a serious loophole that would leave the door open for countries such as Iran to buy nuclear-powered equipment from China or Russia; or other countries with a history of nuclear weapons development such as India, Pakistan or North Korea to decide to build such equipment.
AUKUS will eventually bring China and Russia closer together, but it will split Europe
On September 26th, Russian Television Today (RT) published an article titled ” Plenty more subs in the sea: AUKUS nuclear deal could end up pushing Russia and China closer together but dividing Europe,” written by historian Tarik Cyril Amar of Koc University in Istanbul.
Former US President Barack Obama claimed that Russia is nothing more than a “regional power” at the start of the article, but Russia quickly replied by assisting in the thwarting of the US “regime change” in Syria. Russia and Syria were not in the same region.
The article pointed out that Western adversaries frequently misrepresent or overestimate Russia’s might. Despite the fact that it cannot be compared to the United States, which was preoccupied with starting conflicts after the Cold War, Moscow is powerful enough to make an influence. Russia’s regional security interests cover half of the globe, from Central Europe to the Sea of Japan. As a result, the newly created AUKUS alliance between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia drew the attention of Russian authorities and the Minister of Defense.
At initially, Russia’s attitude was cautious, but it quickly turned critical. Nikolai Patrushev, the Russian Federation’s Secretary of the Security Council, denounced AUKUS as “the model of NATO in Asia” that would expand its reach by attacking China and Russia.
According to the article, the essence of AUKUS is simple. Its center is the transfer of technology from the United States to Australia, which includes nuclear-powered submarine technology. Only six nations have it so far: China, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, the United States, and India, which uses Russian technology in a complicated arrangement.
Despite the fact that a submarine fueled by a nuclear reactor is not the same as one capable of firing nuclear weapons, this technology has significant strategic value. “Excellent speed, range, stealth, and endurance make nuclear submarines a very powerful offensive weapon that can project power and bring the fight closer to the opponent,” according to the US Naval Research Institute.
There is no question, according to the author, that the AUKUS pact boosted Australia’s military dominance while also indirectly increasing US military influence. At least for the for being, Australia’s political clout in Washington has grown. “The United States has no closer and more reliable ally than Australia,” said US President Joe Biden.
Although the media viewed the US, UK, and Australia signing of AUKUS as primarily aimed at countering China, according to the author’s research, AUKUS can have an impact on Russia in three ways: through its impact on Russia, China (or wider Asia), and the European Union’s influence. In the eyes of China and Russia, Australia’s prospective nuclear-powered submarines will have the range to approach North Pacific seas where the Russian fleet is frequently stationed. These submarines will become a more severe concern if they are outfitted with missiles capable of striking Russia (which is physically possible). As a result, Russia may decide to increase the size of its nuclear submarine fleet in the Pacific. Under these conditions, the current strategic cooperation between China and Russia will only become stronger.
AUKUS, especially when combined with the existing “Quad Security Dialogue” mechanism (Quad) between the US, Japan, India, and Australia, as well as the “Five Eyes Alliance” intelligence cooperation between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the US, could eventually lead to an alliance. Encourage the formation of an opposition coalition.
Although AUKUS gives optimism to those in the West who want to start a new Cold War with China, its most significant component—the nuclear submarine supplied by the US to Australia—will take more than ten years to complete. Time is something that can be provided. Russia has cause for concern, but it must not overreact. In reality, only those Westerners who want a rerun of the Cold War will gain from this.
This does not rule out the possibility that Russia, like other countries, would seek its own benefits. For example, Russia may use AUKUS to share its nuclear submarine technology with Asia and other countries. Last but not least, Russia may seek to capitalize on nations like Indonesia and Malaysia’s displeasure in order to enhance bilateral ties and security measures.
Although AUKUS is primarily geared at China, the report stated that it is not only China that is dissatisfied with it. France, an EU member, is the only country in the world that is more enraged than China. The United States’ formation of a new alliance in the Pacific area has caused the most hurt and insult to the United States’ longest European partner. France was booted out of the submarine agreement with Australia, and the United States’ harshness is generally reserved for tiny Middle Eastern countries (except for Israel and Saudi Arabia, of course).
After being booted out of the submarine agreement, France recalled its diplomats in Washington and Canberra and made vehement statements about “stabbing in the back,” but the insult to France appears to have remained mostly unchanged. The European Union’s relationship with the United States has deteriorated. Regardless of differing viewpoints, the EU will not unify behind France. There are indications that the European Union as a whole is hesitant to challenge the US seriously just because France feels embarrassed.
Because of France, the author argues that Western Europe does not want to offend the United States. Following the announcement of AUKUS by the US, UK, and Australia, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Borelli, first backed France, then issued a mild warning to the US, UK, and Australia, reminding them of an obvious truth: partnership usually entails cooperation and coordination. However, the EU’s response to the United States will be limited to this. Anyone in France who believes this is foolish.
The article concluded that, under Macron’s leadership, France has become the most ardent supporter of European “strategic autonomy”—basically, the idea that the world is so affluent, crowded, and developed that it should be treated as such. The region should be self-sufficient. However, no consensus has emerged in Western Europe on this subject. Europe was unable to achieve an agreement even after Trump declared his brutal “America first” strategy and the implementation of AUKUS. Any Russian who expects France’s humiliation to create a schism between the United States and the European Union will be disappointed: the EU is neither clever nor united enough to do so.
AUKUS, the Indo-Pacific, and France’s Role: Fluctuat nec Mergitur
The announcement of the new AUKUS alliance between Australia, the UK and the U.S. came as a shock for France. Paris has never been consulted, nor notified in advance, despite the historic importance of the deal and the huge implications that it bears for France’s interests, not least the brutal termination of the contract to provide 12 submarines to Canberra. The strong reaction and hot anger of the French Foreign minister Le Drian, denouncing it as a “stab in the back”, is thus quite understandable. The new alliance is indeed a game changer for the Indo-Pacific geopolitics, and beyond. France will have to adapt to this new reality, AUKUS may complicate Paris’ efforts, but its Indo-Pacific strategy and commitment will endure.
A game changer in the Indo-Pacific
The Australian decision to acquire nuclear-propelled submarines and to enter a trilateral alliance proposed by the U.S. and the UK opens a new era in the Indo-Pacific. It reflects a dramatic change in Canberra’s posture vis à vis Beijing in recent years. Australia’s new threat assessment motivated a very politically sensitive decision: to step up its game and move from a middle power to a nearly great power status, by entering the exclusive club of the nuclear-powered submarines holders (China, France, India, Russia, the UK and the U.S.). This choice also deepens Australia’s dependence on Washington for its defense on the long term. At the same time, Canberra will have to wait until at least 2040 to get its first SSN—as compared to 2030 for the French conventional subs. At the same time, the U.S. decision to sell this strategic equipment has created a precedent, with potential implications in terms of proliferation, as countries, such as China, might feel encouraged to sell similar devices to Pakistan or North Korea. As such, this move has destabilizing effects, fueling an arms race already nurtured by China’s formidable military build-up.
Besides, AUKUS marks a turning point in the order transition in the Indo-Pacific. In front of China, the networking of the U.S. alliances and partnerships has been going on for a while, but this new trilateral formation is quite a new story. It is designed to be strong, close, and enduring. The sharing of a key strategic defense equipment, but maybe as important, cooperation in such critical domains as new technologies, AI, quantum and so on, is designed to bind the three partners “for generations”. AUKUS thus becomes the new arrangement around which the U.S. plans to organize its strategy in the Indo-Pacific, in front of China.
The Quad was still too diverse—Japan and India have their own limitations in terms of defense cooperation—but with AUKUS, Washington has found a way to reunite a core group of allies to closely sail on its line and help keeping the upper hand over China. Getting the UK, not an Indo-Pacific power, onboard does not sound like a most relevant choice, but it does make sense if the U.S. prioritizes closeness, interoperability and alignment. The three countries have indeed a long history of close cooperation, not least with the intelligence sharing arrangement of the Five Eyes. AUKUS will thus become the new core around which the U.S. will organize the constellation of its partners to check China. This is certainly bad news for Beijing. At the same time, Beijing will also exploit the AUKUS deal to its advantage, in order to further justify its military moves, which probably means that the security situation in the Indo-Pacific is likely to worsen.
A whiplash for France and Europe
An important turning point in the Indo-Pacific turbulent order, AUKUS is also a blow for France.
First, its relations with Australia are now severely damaged. Back in 2018, President Macron chose to unveil France’s Indo-Pacific strategy at the Garden Island base in Sydney, signaling that Australia would become one of France’s key partners in its endeavor. The submarine contract was a structuring element of the relation, strongly committing the two countries. It has never been a long and calm river, with Paris being very much aware of the difficulties in the implementation of the contract. Nonetheless, Canberra never signaled its new preference for a nuclear-powered option, a solution Naval Group is mastering (whether Paris would have agreed to share this technology is another story). Instead, it went to the U.S. and UK to seek an alternative, without consideration for Paris that is now feeling the burn of deception and duplicity. This comes on top of significant economic losses, with impact on thousands of jobs in France.
The ire is even more acute vis à vis the American ally. Striking the AUKUS deal and accepting to sell SSN to Australia is a pure realpolitik move. The Biden administration has so far demonstrated that its systemic rivalry with China is informing its whole external policy. The frustration of an historic ally seems acceptable when it comes to the core U.S. interests: staying ahead of China and checking it are now clearly one of these.
France’s anger is also reinforced by the seeming inconsistency of the Biden administration’s rhetoric on its allies. In January, Jake Sullivan, National Security Advisor, called for a “chorus of voices” in front of China, with the Europeans being the most crucial of U.S. partners. Only the UK has been picked up. France, a leading European power in the Indo-Pacific and a most proactive defender of an Indo-Pacific approach within the EU, has been set aside.
In addition, the unfortunate timing of the AUKUS, the very day the EU published its strategy for the cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, reflects the lack of consideration for the Europeans. In fact, achieving a political consensus among 27 countries that have diverse interests in the Indo-Pacific and enjoy different relations with China is an exceptional achievement that would require tremendous efforts.
In this respect, the U.S. decision is likely to complicate the coordination with the Biden administration on China and the Indo-Pacific, weakening rather than strengthening the democratic front the U.S. aims to build vis à vis Beijing. Some say that the French strategic autonomy has complicated the efforts to set up such a grouping. However, reality is that French and U.S. Indo-Pacific strategies have been working in synergy, with Paris playing the role of a very efficient convening power, able to coordinate with the four Quad countries as well as the ASEAN nations that do not wish to appear as confrontational towards China. Already, the Southeast Asian powers, such as Indonesia or Malaysia, are airing their concern about a new arms race in the region prompted by AUKUS.
Hence, the clumsy AUKUS announcement seems more damaging than French strategic autonomy when it comes to building up solidarity between like-minded partners to face China. Beijing will only be so happy to use this development to try to drive a wedge between them. In the wake of Afghanistan, the widening gap between the U.S. rhetoric on the importance of allies and partners, and the lack of consultation and consideration on important moves only urge the Europeans to accelerate the path towards more strategic autonomy.
At the end of the day, AUKUS questions the very nature of today’s alliances. How should allies behave towards each other? Where should the red lines be? The very fluid geostrategic environment in the Indo-Pacific compels all players to constantly review their choices and adjust their posture to maximize their gains, hedging against risks and protecting their interests. The Indo-Pacific is therefore a fertile ground for flexible arrangements, strategic partnerships, mini-lateral arrangements, issue-based coalitions. The announcement of this new alliance seems to run contrary to this trend. There should be a deep reflection on how to articulate these strategic partnerships and old-style alliances. In addition, the beauty of the “Indo-Pacific” as a geopolitical construct lies in its polymorphic, flexible nature that helps create coalitions of the willing and enable coordination without antagonizing effects. AUKUS should be an agent to foster greater coordination with like-minded countries in the region, not a brake.
France’s Indo-Pacific commitment will endure
France has every reason to be furious and let others know about it. The French diplomacy is indeed strongly showing its deep dissatisfaction and sense of treason towards its allies and partners. This theatrical reaction is also meant to up France’s game to negotiate a proper compensation for its economic loss—and the loss of face. Paris should, however, be careful not to send wrong messages. It makes little sense to put brakes on the discussions towards a EU-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement that will be mutually beneficial, serving to reinforce the EU’s (hence France’s) position in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
Over time, dust will settle, and the partnerships will recover. Australia is an important neighbor to France’s overseas territories in the South Pacific as the two countries, along with New Zealand, are bound by security arrangements to coordinate Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief activities in the area (FRANZ) and monitor IUU fishing. With the U.S., this is the latest major crisis in the transatlantic alliance that has already overcome the moments of frictions dating back to 2003, over the war in Iraq, or 2013, then in Syria. The U.S. (and Australia) will have to work hard to heal the French wounds, as it is in their interest to get France and Europe onboard in the Indo-Pacific.
AUKUS will certainly make life more difficult for Atlanticists and for the proponents of an ambitious French posture in the Indo-Pacific alike. It is strengthening the camp of the skeptics, who have questioned the Indo-Pacific strategy from the start, fearing capacity overstretch and an entrapment in a confrontational U.S. policy towards China.
This said, France’s Indo-Pacific commitment will not weaken, not least because the nation maintains significant sovereign interests in the region. Territories in both the Indian Ocean (Islands of Mayotte and La Réunion) and the Pacific (New Caledonia, French Polynesia…), host some 1.5 million citizens and more than 90% of its large EEZ (9 million km²). France maintains a military presence of 8,000 personnel to take care of this vast area. Therefore, France’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific is not a mere rhetorical posture but a sustained commitment. Besides, some of France’s major trade and security partners are located in the region, while the safety of the maritime routes linking Europe and East Asia is key to its economic security.
Finally, the Indo-Pacific is the primary locus of the Sino-American strategic rivalry that will (with all probability) shape the future world order. France, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, is a capable and responsible stakeholder that has already demonstrated the credibility of its commitment to support a rules-based order and stability in the region. This year alone, Paris sent its nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) in the South China Sea in February, held a quadrilateral France-US-Japan-Australia amphibious exercises in May in a Japanese remote island, led the La Pérouse naval exercise with the four Quad powers in the Indian Ocean and sent Rafale fighters all the way to Polynesia and Hawaii this summer.
After AUKUS, France will step up its efforts to build up a network of middle powers. Japan and India, while welcoming the new alliance, will strive to keep Paris fully engaged in the region, and New Delhi might be interested in a new defense deal. Paris is in good way to sell 36 Rafale fighters to Indonesia and is working on fostering its partnerships with Malaysia, the Philippines and ASEAN, with which a development partnership was inked in March. French and European’s inclusive visions for the Indo-Pacific are convergent with ASEAN’s approach, which may explain why the EU emerged as one of the most trusted partners for these countries.
More importantly, Paris’ Indo-Pacific approach will be resolutely articulated with the EU’s brand-new strategy in the region from now on. The two approaches usefully work in synergy and complement each other. The EU’s strategy has a strong focus on building resilient value chains, especially in semiconductors, including by setting up a deal with Taiwan. Standards setting in trade, digital domains and emerging technologies, “in line with democratic principles”, is one of the priority objectives of the EU. The strategy even mentions “the EU’s interest in engaging with the QUAD on issues of common interest such as climate change, technology or vaccines”. This shows that the EU’s priorities are in line with America’s core concerns and that strategic autonomy is not averse to a necessary and close cooperation with Washington and other key partners in the Indo-Pacific. The EU being a normative superpower and a major economic player, the U.S. will not have the luxury to dismiss it if it really wants to weigh on China’s choices. In the glimpse of the brave new world that AUKUS just unveiled, France and Europe remain significant and relevant players.
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