អាមេរិកនៅខាងក្រៅអឺរ៉ុបក្នុងការប្រយុទ្ធដើម្បីបញ្ឈប់មហិច្ឆតារបស់ចិន

 AUKUS underscores EU's global weakness even as it tries to expand influence in Asia

The new AUKUS security alliance of three English-speaking nations signals a deeper U.S. shift away from Europe in its attempts to stem China's global ambitions.

The abrupt announcement of the pact between the U.S., the U.K. and Australia, which provides Canberra with American and British technology to build nuclear-powered submarines, has stunned many European Union and NATO member states.

France, in particular, is livid. Having lost a multibillion-dollar submarine deal with Australia, Paris called the move a "stab in the back" and recalled its ambassadors to Washington and Canberra.

French President Emmanuel Macron and U.S. President Joe Biden spoke on the phone last week in an attempt to heal the rift, and Paris vowed to return its ambassador as a gesture to restore "confidence." But the AUKUS move has scarred the European Union, underscoring its geopolitical weakness and putting the 27-nation bloc at risk of being marginalized in the broader U.S.-China global power game.

"The U.S. loss of interest for Europe is not a new phenomenon," Frederic Grare, a senior policy fellow at the Asia Program at the European Council on Foreign Relations, told Nikkei Asia. "If Trump will be remembered for his explicit contempt for the EU, disinterest predated his election. ... The rivalry with China is now America's first concern, and Washington acts accordingly. It should surprise no one."

After four years of former U.S. President Donald Trump's "America First" approach, which often led to decisions that blindsided European countries, Biden's "America's Back" seemed like a breath of fresh air. Just a few months ago, Secretary of State Antony Blinken cracked jokes in French in Paris and spoke about revitalizing the trans-Atlantic relationship.

But this hope for closer U.S.-Europe ties was quickly shattered by the chaotic U.S. pullout from Afghanistan, which was poorly coordinated with NATO. And the AUKUS pact has brought home the reality in European capitals that EU nations are not partners of choice for Washington for specific deals.

Charles Michel, the president of the European Council, said AUKUS shows Biden lacks confidence in Europe. Under Trump, he added, "at least in tone, content and wording, it was clear that the EU was not a partner, not an irreplaceable ally."

For some American decision-makers, dealing with a collective -- and often confusing -- entity like the EU is time-consuming, and they may feel more at ease with the U.K. and Australia.

Many EU member states have close trade relations with China and will not easily sacrifice their economic interests for the sake of the U.S. -- especially now they feel they have been stabbed in the back. France, Germany, Italy and Spain have repeatedly rejected Biden's calls for an alliance against Beijing.

Last week, Josep Borrell, the EU's high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, said the bloc's plan is for "cooperation, not confrontation" with China.

Plamen Tonchev, head of the Asia unit at the Athens-based Institute of International Economic Relations, told Nikkei Asia, "It is true that the 27 EU member states have 27 different views on China."

The 2019 Strategic Outlook released by the European Commission and the European External Action Service came up with a complex definition of China as a "partner, competitor and rival, Tonchev said. "When the U.S. sees China primarily as a rival, the EU has a bit more relaxed attitude. Even if the mood is changing, Europe is not yet ready to adopt Washington's confrontational stance towards China."

Treading a path between the U.S. and China is not an end in itself. In many areas, European and American interests are the same, and the two sides can benefit from the mutual leverage this brings, analysts say.

"Views differ within the bloc, but everyone agrees on some difficult policy areas, such as sanctioning Chinese officials for their repressive practices in Xinjiang," Andrew Small, a senior trans-Atlantic fellow with the Asia program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, told Nikkei Asia. "Likewise, there is a consensus to overhaul the EU's economic instruments to take on the challenge of Chinese nonmarket practices."

A day after the announcement of the AUKUS submarine deal, the EU unveiled its Indo-Pacific Strategy paper, a document defining Brussels' attempts to expand its influence in Asia. But this new strategy is unlikely to significantly boost the EU's influence in the region, which is of relatively new interest for the bloc.

"In practical terms, a few European states (including the U.K.) are ready and willing to project military power in the region," Tonchev said. "The EU approach to 'connectivity' with the Indo-Pacific is softer, based on economic relations and cooperation, even if security is becoming a priority for the EU."

But, he added, "The idea of a collective EU military response to what's happening in, say, the South China Sea would be outlandish at this stage."

Grare said the AUKUS message delivered by the U.S. is contradictory. "On the one hand, they had been telling the EU to do more in Asia, but on the other hand, they were threatening to marginalize Europe when they made a step forward.

"It may leave the EU indecisive about what their posture should be in Asia, and also uncertain of what it means to be a U.S. ally," he added.

The Indo-Pacific concept is still new for Europe, but European interests in South Asia, the western Indian Ocean and East Asia are long-standing. France, for instance, considers the region of crucial strategic and economic importance, with 1.65 million French citizens on islands including La Reunion, New Caledonia, Mayotte and French Polynesia.

Most European states continue to rely on the U.S. to guarantee security and see this as a more solid commitment than they could expect from their fellow Europeans. But the AUKUS snub was felt across the continent, and leaders are saying that Europe must start to think differently about defense and stand up for its interests.

"Certainly, the EU should have more capacity to influence the outcomes in the Indo-Pacific, which is critical to European interests in the decades ahead," Small said. "But realistically, there are limitations to the military role that Europe can play. So a lot of Europe's capacity to project will be geoeconomic."

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen used her annual state of the union speech to appeal for greater strategic autonomy for the bloc. While this has been backed by France for years, other member states, as well as some leading EU officials, have pushed against this stance.

"The call for strategic autonomy was never a call for strategic autarky but, rather, a call for greater initiative and involvement of the EU in the world strategic affairs," Grare said.

One potential example of such self-reliance was a defense agreement signed Tuesday between France and Greece.

Macron said the deal that foresees the purchase by Greece of three French-built frigates, with the option of a fourth, was "an audacious first step towards European strategic autonomy."

Nikkei Asia