ស្នាមញញឹមថ្មីរបស់លោក ស៊ី ជីនពីង បានធ្វើឱ្យប្រទេសចិន ធ្លាក់ចូលក្នុងកិច្ចពិភាក្សាស្តីពីអាកាសធាតុ

 Beijing's bandwidth to deliver is shrinking as its economic performance wanes

In Xi Jinping's official encounters with Western leaders at the Group of 20 Summit last week in Bali, the Chinese leader was accommodating, even collaborative.

This made for a stark contrast with his rigid appearance last month at the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan before that.

Indeed, Xi's swirling agenda of bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the G-20 could be seen as a charm offensive to shift from confrontation with the West to what might be called re-engagement with Chinese characteristics.

Something comparable could be seen at the 27th Conference of the Parties of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP27) this month in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt.

Western countries are keen to collaborate with China on climate change as joint action is urgently needed. Some observers might have expected that the overlapping timing of COP27 and the G-20 summit in Bali would have seen an extension of harmonious vibes that might have helped negotiators to achieve progress and agreement between developed nations and the developing world's big emitters like China.

The reality, though, was quite underwhelming.

Starting with the positive, consensus was finally reached to create a "loss and damage" fund to provide aid to the developing countries most vulnerable to, and battered by, climate change-driven disasters.

But the concession by developed economies to finance the fund was not accompanied by new targets or concrete measures to avoid global temperature rising more than 1.5 C from preindustrial levels.

There was also no agreement on phasing out coal, the most polluting fossil fuel, though this has been under discussion since CO26 last year in Glasgow, Scotland. Nor was a binding agreement reached on curbing methane emissions or expanding renewable energy use. Most importantly, no consensus was reached to accelerate the year for peak emissions to 2025 from 2030.

China's charm offensive enabled Beijing to avoid agreeing to such commitments without bearing a major cost.

While China said it would make more efforts to reduce its methane emissions, it held back from joining the U.S.-led Global Methane Pledge to reduce discharges by 30% by 2030. China did not even commit to pay into the loss and damage fund as many developing economies expected, as its firm self-identification as a developing country turned handy once again.

Still, despite its charm offensive at the G-20, expectations for China to take more action on climate change as a responsible stakeholder are rising. Having managed to get through COP27 does not mean China will not be expected to be more ambitious on its targets for peaking emissions, curbing methane or phasing out coal power.

As expectations rise, China's bandwidth to deliver on new commitments is shrinking as its economic performance wanes, alongside its fiscal space to act.

Moving out of coal, which still accounted for 56% of China's energy consumption as of 2021, will require a titanic effort greater than what Beijing can summon as it battles side effects from zero-COVID policies and the collapse of its real estate sector.

All in all, one can argue that given Xi's charm offensive during the G-20, Western leaders were expecting more from China at COP27 regarding climate change cooperation.

China's underwhelming response in Sharm el-Sheikh, whether in terms of contributing to the new loss and damage fund or advancing its target for peaking emissions, might be related to the state of its economy and the need to continue to meet its domestic thirst for energy at the least cost possible, which continues to be coal.

We need to realize that China's situation is such that there is never a good time to move ahead more decisively on climate. Now that the economy is decelerating, resulting in lower demand for energy, financial considerations are becoming more pressing as fiscal accounts worsen. This makes the move away from coal harder.

By the same token, if economic growth improves as China moves out of zero COVID, more energy will be needed and replacing coal will also be problematic.

This means that the West needs to be careful about having too many illusions as to the degree of cooperation China can guarantee on climate change. The question is whether a Plan B is at all possible or whether attention should be refocused on climate adaptation.

Nikkei Asia