យុទ្ធសាស្ត្រសន្តិសុខថ្មីរបស់ជប៉ុននឹងធ្វើឱ្យចិនកាន់តែមានការជឿជាក់

 Tokyo needs to realize its interests do not always align with those of the U.S.

A Japan Ground Self-Defense Force vehicle launches a type 12 surface-to-ship missile during an exercise: The ultimate issue is to what extent Japan is willing to be a tail that is wagged. (Handout photo from Japan Ground Self-Defense Force) 

Huang Jing is University Professor and director of the Institute of U.S. and Pacific studies at Shanghai International Studies University. 

Japan's new National Security Strategy marks a paradigm shift which will see defense spending rise to 2% of the country's gross domestic product and the establishment of a counterstrike capability.

These measures would appear to run counter to Article 9 of the country's pacifist constitution, which renounces the sovereign right of belligerency and outlaws war as a means to settle international disputes involving the Japanese state.

The justification given for this fundamental shift is a changed security environment, in which China's rise is perceived to pose the "greatest strategic challenge ever" to Japan.

This stance will not be helpful, however, for Sino-Japanese relations, as the devastating crimes committed by imperialist Japan in 1937-1945 remain the most painful memory for the Chinese today.

But China should not, and will not, react to the NSS without a thorough consideration of the larger picture. It knows that the NSS does not reflect a strategic consensus due to the differences among Japan's policymakers as well as the general public.

As the new strategy is transformed into concrete policies, domestic opposition can be expected to be substantial. Given the low public approval rate of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, Beijing can bide its time.

Responses from other neighboring countries have not been favorable either. Like China, Russia has rejected the NSS, while Southeast Asian countries have been suspicious about whether Japan's new direction will help regional peace and stability. Fellow U.S. ally South Korea has been critical too.

On the other hand, the promised military buildup, especially in terms of offensive capability, will not only strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance vis-a-vis China but will also reinforce U.S. military dominance in the Indo-Pacific region, seen as necessary for Washington to stay ahead of Beijing.

Yet Japan should realize that its interests in the region and beyond will not always converge geopolitically and economically with those of the U.S.

A China-Russia coalition against Japan would be a security nightmare for Tokyo. That is why late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe bent over backward to try to improve relations with Moscow, even hesitating to fully join in sanctions over Russia's intervention in Ukraine in 2014. Kishida, too, was understandably tentative about sanctions when Russia escalated its offensive last year.

Noticeably, there has been an increase, both in consequence and scale, in joint Russo-Chinese military exercises in recent years. Pointedly, the two launched a joint naval exercise near Japanese waters immediately after the NSS was adopted. While tracking the movement of Chinese and Russian forces has been a strain on Japan, there has been little response from the U.S. forces deployed in the country.

There is also a mismatch in Japan's security and economic interests toward China, which has remained its largest trade partner since 2007.

Although the U.S. is trying to decouple from China, especially in high-technology industries and has pushed Tokyo hard to follow suit, only 3.8% of 679 Japanese companies with substantial investments in China said last year that they planned to reduce or remove their operations there in a periodic survey by the Japan External Trade Organization. This was the lowest proportion seen since 2010.

It is in this regard that we see a subtle but significant divergence between the U.S. and Japan. While the U.S. under former President Donald Trump walked away from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and a planned counterpart agreement with the EU, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Japan pushed forward on both fronts.

The divergence in economic approach reflects a structural obstacle between the two allies on the issue of the normalcy of Japan's statehood.

Japan's drive for normalcy, initiated in the early 1950s, was long overwhelmed by a conservative mainstream view that economic growth required compromising state sovereignty in diplomacy and defense.

Under former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, the push for normalcy made it onto the political agenda. The effort then gained momentum under Abe, who pledged to "take back Japan" in his second term.

In this sense, Japan's successful realization of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement of Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement were truly significant milestones in its drive toward normalcy, highlighting not only the country's economic potency but also its diplomatic competence.

America's Asia-Pacific security architecture is based on Washington's alliance with Tokyo, so the U.S. has to be in control to ensure that this cornerstone works first and foremost for its interests.

The U.S. has hailed the NSS not just because it strengthens Japan's military capability but because it will weld Tokyo deeper into the U.S.-led security architecture by increasing Japan's dependence on Washington for weapon supplies, training and intelligence.

From Japan's perspective, however, China's rise and the relative decline of U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific region have made the U.S. more reliant on Japan to maintain its dominance in the area. This has strengthened Japan's position in the alliance, which in turn has encouraged and justified its drive for normalcy.

There is little doubt that Japan needs the alliance as badly as the U.S., as the world order is evolving from a unipolar hegemony toward multipolar competition and balance. But the ultimate issue is to what extent Japan is willing to be a tail that is wagged, or whether it is capable of wagging the dog instead, in dealing with China. The adoption of the NSS will make this issue potentially thornier for the two allies.

Indeed, as China's rise is bound to continue, the new NSS will have little impact on the Sino-Japanese power balance. But it will expand the trust deficit between China and Japan, driving the two Asian neighbors further in the wrong direction.

Regarding China, Japan's worry is all about the future. The Japanese seem to have little confidence in an increasingly powerful and assertive China, given their dispute over the Senkaku Islands, which China claims and calls the Diaoyu, and historical animosity between the two nations. Ironically, Beijing's endless demands for apologies have confirmed Japan's anxiety that as China gets stronger, it may seek vengeance.

For China, Japan's inability to eviscerate its imperialist past from its postwar national identity, as Germany did with Nazism, and the recent trend toward rearmament have intensified suspicions that Japan could return to its militarist past.

Thus, the essential challenge that the new NSS has brought to China is not about what tit-for-tat countermeasure to take but how to convince Japan that a military buildup will be counterproductive. It is undeniable that both nations will go to hell should they let war take place again between them.

Nikkei Asia